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I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT 
In her Supplemental Brief, Appellee rehashes the history of the case and discusses all the 
different circumstances in which she believes Mr. Wechsler was ordered to do this or that. She 
seeks to say that Mr. Wechsler was held in contempt because he disobeyed the District Court's 
order from this or that date. Appellee is mistaken in these allegations. The District Court stated 
the basis of the contempt in its own order. The court clearly said that "His failure to obey the 
Writ of Assistance put him in contempt of court." Decision on Motion for Contempt, Aug 
pg. 66. The Writ of Assistance, drafted by Appellee, contains the following mandate from 
the court, "TO THE SHERIFF OF BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO: In the 
name of the State of Idaho, you are hereby commanded to enter the home of the Defendant 
located at 273 Taft Ave., Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho, and take possession of:," a list 
of objects and documents. See Order Granting Motion to Augment, 121, Exh. to Affidavit of 
Ancillary Receiver in Support of Motion for Contempt, file-stamped June 20, 2016. There is no 
command to Appellant in this document. If Mr. Wechsler and Deputy Nickel were standing 
next to each other in the courtroom and a judge told Deputy Nickel to search Mr. Wechsler' s 
pockets and Deputy Nickel failed to do it, Mr. Wechsler has not disobeyed an order of the 
court, the deputy has. If Mr. Wechsler refuses to allow the deputy to search his pockets by 
asserting his Fourth Amendment rights, he has still not disobeyed an order of the court 
because the court has not commanded any action from him. Appellant is not suggesting that 
Deputy Nickel be held in contempt, but simply that he had a mandate from the court and Mr. 
Wechsler did not. 
Although the meaning of paragraph two on page three of Appellee' s Supplemental 
Briefing is unclear, she states more than once that Appellant was "well aware" of certain 
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things. Supplemental Response Brief, pg. 3. These are statements of pure speculation and were 
made without proper foundation. Appellee also states that "The Writ ordered that the 
documents relevant to the Judgment be produced to the Receiver." Supplemental Response 
Brief, pg. 3. This statement is correct, yet misleading. The Writ commands the Bannock County 
Sheriff to produce all documents seized by them in the execution of the Writ to the Receiver. 
There is no command to Appellant anywhere in the Writ. Regarding whether or not Appellant 
read the Writ when it was presented to him, Deputy Nickel stated on direct examination that 
when the Writ was presented to him, Mr. Wechsler "sat down on the steps and proceeded to read 
it for a few minutes -- or a few seconds, I guess, a minute." It is apparent from this statement that 
Deputy Nickel paid little attention to how long Appellant actually spent with the document, but 
also that it was not long enough to review a legal document of such import. 
Appellee also seeks to portray to this Court that "The Bannock County Sheriffs had 
accompanied the Receiver to the Debtor's home." Supplemental Response Brief, pg. 3. This 
statement is false. The Receiver testified under oath that the deputies were there when he arrived, 
and that he went alone. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Contempt, pg. 38 lines 15-22. 
The deputies and the Receiver arrived separately and, pursuant to the Receiver's own statement 
under oath, he was never closer than 15 feet away from Appellant's front door, and was as far 
away as "20 to 30 feet from the deputy." Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Contempt, pgs. 
18, 19, 39 lines 23-25, 1-5, 11-15. 
In this case, the Deputy's supervisor advised him ahead of time that they would not 
conduct a search without a warrant if one was asked for. Transcript of Hearing on Motion 
for Contempt, p. 24, lines 13-16. The District Court itself stated that "[t]he Deputies should 
have entered Norman's home against his wishes." Decision on Motion for Contempt, Aug 
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pg. 66. The court acknowledged that the mandate in the Writ of Assistance was to the 
Bannock County Sheriff, yet held Appellant in contempt. The finding of contempt was in 
error and should be reversed by this Court and remanded with instructions. 
Appellant relies on his previous pleadings and briefing to answer Appellee's claims 
regarding the the Motion to Compel, Order Appointing Ancillary Receiver and the improper 
ex parte manner in which Appellee obtained, and the District Court granted, the Writ of 
Assistance. 
II. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT WAS VIOLATED 
The District Court, and Appellee, did not conduct the proper analysis regarding 
Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights. The District Court stated that "while Sharon Wechsler 
was the party that filed the Motion for Contempt, Sharon did not see the contempt, was not 
subpoenaed as a witness, nor would her presence at the hearing have aided the Court in any 
way. While Sharon was affected by Norman's actions, the Court was the victim of Norman's 
alleged contempt because it was the Court's order that Norman did not follow. Sharon's 
attorney properly filed the paperwork for contempt, but Smith and the Bannock County 
Sherriff s officers were those who laid out the facts necessary to allege contempt and are 
Norman's accusers. Norman was able to confront them via cross-examination therefore 
Norman's Sixth Amendment rights, if applicable, were not violated due to Sharon's absence." 
Decision on Motion for Contempt, Aug pg. 64. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Crawford v. 
Washington that if there was testimonial evidence to be used against the Defendant in a 
criminal prosecution, the person giving that evidence must be present. 1 Crawford v. 
1 "The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' We have held that this bedrock procedural 
guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 
1359 (2004). 
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Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004). The District Court found that, 
although the Motion for Contempt was filed on behalf of the Receiver (whom counsel for 
Appellee claims not to represent), the Motion was filed by Appellee and that she made the 
claims therein. These statements by Appellee were testimonial. As a result, the court itself 
made it necessary for Appellee to be present to be confronted with cross examination in the 
prosecution by Appellee of criminal contempt in which she moved the court to incarcerate 
Appellant. His Sixth Amendment right to confront was improperly analyzed, and then 
violated, in the court below. Therefore, Appellant moves this Court to reverse and remand 
with instructions. 
III. APPELLEE'S MOTION TO STRIKE LACKS PROPER GROUNDS 
Appellee provided no rule or case law to support the Motion to Strike included with her 
Supplemental Briefing. Neither was included because there is no rule or case law which supports 
her position. While there is no appellate rule governing motions to strike, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 12(f) provides the correct standard. The rule, in pertinent part, states: "The 
court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter." (Emphasis added.) 
Five grounds for a motion to strike are provided by I.R.C.P. 12(f). Appellee alleged none 
of them. Nor has Appellee cited any rule of evidence to support her Motion. Appellee provided 
no foundation or authority to strike material from Appellant's Brief 
Additionally, the excerpt included in Appellant's Brief is not responsive. In the citation 
provided on page 5, <J[ B(l), Appellant is agreeing with a statement by Appellee in her pleadings, 
and using it to support his argument. Even if the content were responsive, there is no rule or case 
prohibiting its inclusion. Appellee gives one citation and improperly asks this Court to strike 
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three pages of Appellant's Brief. Supplemental Response Brief, pg. 5, § B(l). Because Appellee 
has not provided foundation or support for her Motion to Strike, Appellant requests that the Court 
deny the Motion. 
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
In general, Appellant relies upon his previously submitted briefing to support the 
argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Only a few of the specific points 
raised in Appellee' s briefing will be addressed here. 
Appellee states in her briefing that "Debtor repeatedly states that the Bannock County 
deputies and prosecutor could have no other purpose but to further their own ends during the 
service of the Writ of Assistance. However, the Debtor conspicuously does not name what ends 
the Bannock County deputies and prosecutor were serving." Supplemental Response Brief, pg. 6. 
These statements are wholly incorrect. Appellant stated in his brief that "The purpose of the 
[Sheriffs deputies and the Ancillary Receiver] was to conduct the business of the District Court 
in serving the Writ, not to further their own ends. Mr. Smith was not there to recover something 
for himself, he was there at the direction of the court, with sheriffs deputies, to conduct a search 
and seize property. Following the search he was to report to the District Court as to his findings, 
not to Appellee. Any action taken by him was directed by the court. He was and is an agent of 
the court, and therefore, of the government. The Bannock County Prosecutor can only have been 
there as a representative of the government, especially since the Ancillary Receiver noted that he 
was 'in a suit."' Appellant has repeatedly stated that the action taken was government, not 
private, action. As such, constitutional protection from government action, as provided by the 
Fourth Amendment, is implicated. 
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Appellee's analysis of United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982), is also 
flawed. She seeks to impose a bright line test for government action, which the Miller court 
specifically said is inappropriate. Appellee stated: "The government action that the Miller case 
refers to is clearly action by the State in the investigation or prosecution of crimes or similar 
offens~s." Supplemental Response Brief, pg. 7. The Miller court stated: "Our analysis starts with 
United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981). There we noted that there is no bright 
line that distinguishes instances of 'government' conduct from instances of 'private' 
conduct, and that we should refer to certain general principles when analyzing cases in the 'gray 
area.'" Id. at 791. We discussed those general principles: While a certain degree of governmental 
participation is necessary before a private citizen is transformed into an agent of the state, de 
minimis or incidental contacts between the citizen and law enforcement agents prior to or during 
the course of a search or seizure will not subject the search to fourth amendment scrutiny. The 
government must be involved either directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager 
of the private citizen's actions before we deem the citizen to be an instrument of the state ... " 
United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 656-57 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). The above cited 
section of Miller demonstrates that government action is not defined by its character but by the 
level of government participation. Government participation in this case was significant in that 
there were two Bannock County deputies, a Bannock County prosecutor, and an agent of the 
District Court present. Even if the government was not "seeking entrance to the property in 
furtherance of its own ends or to reap the benefits of the proposed search," they certainly would 
have taken advantage of anything found in the home, and the effect would have been the same, 
without Fourth Amendment protection. This high level of government presence and 
participation, especially that of a prosecutor, demonstrates that there was government action, and 
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that Appellant's Fourth Amendment protections were violated. Appellant thus requests that this 
Court reverse the action of the lower court and remand the case with instructions. 
V. MOTION TO STRIKE FOOTNOTE 
In footnote 1 on page 6 of Appellee's Supplemental Response Brief, Appellee seeks to 
present a statement as to the identity of the Bannock County prosecutor who was present when 
the Writ of Assistance was served without providing foundation to support it. The identity of the 
Bannock County prosecutor who was present was never testified to, or proven in the court 
below, and Appellee provided no citation to the record. As such, this information constitutes an 
insufficient defense and is impertinent to Appellant's claims pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(f). Appellant moves that the footnote be stricken from Appellee's Supplemental 
Response Brief, and that it not be considered by this Court. 
VI. ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellant moves the Court to award all attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of this 
appeal, and especially at this time as to this Response to Supplemental Briefing, pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and I.R.C.P. 37(c). Appellee provided no rule, statute, grounds of 
foundation for her Motion to Strike. As such, it was frivolous and Appellant should be awarded 
attorney fees. Appellee should not be awarded attorney fees as to her Supplemental Briefing. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the Writ of Assistance contained no mandate for Appellant Norman Wechsler, 
the District Court found that his failure to obey the Writ of Assistance put him in 
contempt of court. Based on the foregoing, as well as Appellant's other pleadings in this case, 
this finding was improper and should be reversed and remanded with instructions. 
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Appellee filed a Motion to Strike a portion of Appellant's pleadings without providing a 
proper legal basis for the motion. Appellant was therefore required to respond to the improper 
Motion. Because the Motion had no legal basis, it should be denied and Appellant should be 
awarded attorney fees expended in defending against it. 
As demonstrated above, and in Appellant's other pleadings in this case, the District Court 
failed to properly protect Appellant's Sixth and Fourth Amendment rights against improper 
government action. The District Court's decisions in regarding these rights should therefore be 
reversed and remanded with instructions. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, Appellee improperly included inadmissible, foundationless 
information in footnote 1 on page 6 of her Supplemental Briefing. The footnote should be 
stricken and not considered by this Court. 
The above findings of the court below were improper and should be reversed by this 
Court and remanded with instructions. Appellant should be awarded attorney fees, as Appellee 
filed a Motion to Strike without proper legal basis, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and 
I.R.C.P. 54(e). Appellant requests this and any other relief the Court deems just and fair under 
the circumstances on the information provided herein, and the other briefing and pleadings filed 
by Appellant. . ~ 
DATED this2:__ day of July, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY certify that a copy of the foregoing Response to Appellee 's Supplemental 
Brief was served on the following named person at the address shown and in the manner 
indicated. 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
DATED this O C July, 20 . 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
~Facsimile: (208) 232-6109 
........- [ j Hand Delivered 
[ ] Email: sjm@racinelaw.net; 
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